United Discord

A few issues remain unresolved in my mind. One is the lack of Indian support for the Tibetan cause – or rather their passivity. For example, the only shops to open during the local demonstrations against the Olympic Games were those which were Indian owned. When I asked directions to the Candle Light Vigil (in the Indian owned internet shop) I was told to “ask a Tibetan”. If the local Indian population support a Free Tibet for their neighbours, they appear to do so quietly.

Even more seeds of queries grew in my mind after I read a poster advertising a lecture entitled “New Realities in China and Tibet: after the Protest”. The 'protests' referred to were the demonstrations which broke out across Tibet last March. All that I knew from my own limited research were that the 'new realities' in Tibet were that the Chinese authorities had cracked down on movement, freedom of information and had began mass round up campaigns of ex political prisoners as well as men and boys under thirty years of age, meanwhile, China virtually closed all of it's international borders.

The lecture was given by a Tibetan Scholar, Robbie Barnett and sponsored by Tibet On Line. The audience was primarily international, and at a guess I would say composed of volunteers and long term residents, although there were also many smartly dressed young Tibetan women and men.

Robbie began his lecture by reminding the audience that the slide show he was about to present was of views from an 'outsider' and that he was aware that he was going to be “annoyingly antagonistic”. This was because he was trying not to show a purely sympathetic view of the situation by approaching his research from the point of view of a cynic.

He began with a quick lesson in political geography, reminding the audience that just like the definition of Occupied Palestinian Territories has a different definition for the Palestinians than it does for the Chinese, 'Occupied Tibet' also has a different reference point for the Tibetans than it does for the Chinese. For the Chinese State, the region referred to as the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) is centered around Lhasa and is much smaller than the area agreed to during the 17 point agreement between China and Tibet which the young Dalai Lama was forced to sign in 1951. The rest of occupied Tibet is now referred to as the Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAP).

Robbie explained that the March 2008 protests against the Chinese occupation were unique in that the majority of the protests took place outside of the TAR. After the main riots began in Lhasa outbreaks spread around Tibet with the aid of cellphones and the underground Tibetan radio. Unlike the 1980 protests which were based in Lhasa and primarily lead by monks and nuns, the March 2008 protests showed a massive increase in peaceful protests organised by students. This new mobilisation reflects the growth of a new elite or middle class. However, the majority of the protests were comprised of monks, nuns and lay people. Not only this but more and more people from the rural areas and towns were becoming involved in the protests, which represents a massive increase from the past and a huge shift in demographic organisation.

Now, after the demonstrations, Robbie described Tibet as “a kind of shadow world, where we don't know really what is happening”. Access to reliable information has become incredibly difficult to ascertain after the crack down on foreign media, combined with the closing of the borders. Admittedly China invited the foreign media on a tour of Lhasa, which involved meetings with Tibetan monks who were briefed with what to say. The monks actually sabotaged the tour by refusing their scripts and instead chanting opposition slogans to China while trying to interact with the visiting media. Robbie speculated that the “normal fabric of everyday life is probably ok” but that the number of prisoners had soared, and sources suggested that both ex-prisoners, returnees and anyone found without Chinese identity cards had been arrested. Despite the Tibetan use of the electronic media to coordinate the demonstrations, the advances in technology also means that China now has the ability to monitor and if necessary cut access to modern channels of communication. Not only that but Chinese manipulation of the media has also improved. In contrast to 1987 China has began to publicly acknowledge revealed or exposed incidents by providing their own version, or even preempting the release of information and report their own simplised version. This shows that while electronic media is making information more accessible, China is also become more adept at controlling it. Moreover, China is using the media to exaggerate tensions between the Tibetans and Chinese. For example, the Chinese news channels repeatedly aired isolated scenes of Tibetans attacking Chinese migrations.

Alternatively, although it is true that these more frequent out lashes against the Chinese migrants are happening this in itself is reflecting a change in the kinds of protests, which are indeed no longer without violent outbreaks. Images of young monks throwing stones and rocks were replayed throughout the Chinese media. Internationally this has also began to change the way which Tibet is thought about – and this is the reality, Robbie argued – that Tibet is no Shangri-la and that monks may be Buddhists but they are also young men, who are even being denied a proper religious education and guidance. Robbie argues that this change in how Tibet is viewed is an extremely important one, as until Tibet becomes a 'serious' issue, Western politicians will not take it 'seriously'. This internal unrest despite the massive restraint on the Tibetan people to demonstrate freely, shows that something has to give. For a long time, the Dalia Lama, the exile community, foreign analysts and even Chinese Human Rights activists have been raising the issue of Tibet, but with the increasing tensions rising inside of Tibet, it is definitely time for Tibet to be put on the international agenda.

And why now? Why are Tibetans inside Tibet finally finding a voice – even if it is at a high cost? Robbie began by warning of the dangers of making generalisations but continued to highlight several recent developments as possible reasons.

Firstly Tibet and Buddhism have been inseparable for years. With low levels of education, and a feeling of persecution, the Chinese State are having problems breaking this link. However, ever since their invasion of Tibet, the Buddhist religion has remained under continuous persecution. The Chinese state maintain that there is religious freedom, and indeed there are still pilgrims, monasteries and festivals in Tibet, but the actual 'substance' of Buddhism – the active instruction, debate and development of its teaching is a shadow of its former self. This gives further explanation as to why 'monks' are portraying particularly un-monk like behaviour. Furthermore, monks and nuns are provided with a complementary 're-education' programme by the Chinese state. Not only this but 'Tibetan Buddhism' is actually being reconstructed by the Chinese as monasteries are being rebuilt and Chinese pseudo monks reinstated. The result is a superficial 'religious tolerance' and a deeper rewriting of Tibetan Buddhist history. Likewise, government employees and family members are requested to abstain from religious affiliation. However, this is not an 'official' line, and perhaps it would be easier to over rule if it was, but rather it is through cohesion and fear that government employees either worship in secret or not at all. In 1996 all photographs of Tibet's spiritual leader were banned – and once again although the official line was that this was only applicable inside monasteries, in reality, anyone 'caught' with a photograph of their spiritual leader came under immediate suspicion of being a 'splitist' and risked harassment at the very least and imprisonment at the most. Tibetan university students also risk persecution if they are 'found out' to be Buddhists, although Chinese students have much more freedom to express their spirituality. This of course creates tension amongst some Chinese students, who find it impossible to believe the testimonies of their Tibetan counterparts after not experiencing the same infringement of their Rights.

Another explanation which Robbie gave for the March protests was that of economic failure: In 1990 there were 500 Chinese business inside Tibet and yet by 2001 this number had grown to around 45,000. In an attempt to buy the support of the Tibetan elite (which is a very small minority inside of Tibet) any government employees have received an increase in salary. However, this has done nothing to stem the economic gap between the rural areas and the urban areas. Even within the urban areas, many Tibetan businesses are reliant on foreign tourists, which (due to Chinese restrictions) is a highly unstable market. Although the Chinese state continues to pour funding into Tibetan infrastructure, the 'average' Tibetan is not feeling the benefits. On the contrary the forced expansion of Lhasa has only fueled tensions between ethnic Chinese and Tibetans living in the capital. Tibetans are feeling mariginalied – they are offered lower wages even though they are usually second choice to Chinese workers who are flooding to Tibet in promise of employment. The rapid expansion and modernisation of the city has only accentuated fears of its cultural erosion. Shop signs, road signs and public information is all written in the Chinese language. Military bases surround the area.

There are also other more recent catalytic events – such as the opening of the 2006 railway from Beijing to Lhasa. This facilitated the movement of Chinese business men and Chinese workers into the area. In fact in 2006 there was actually a policy that there should be no limit on migration to Tibet. During the same period the Chinese state stepped up its resettlement programme of Tibetan nomads. As with many other indigenous populations, the Tibetan nomads have been forcibly instated in permanent houses. This is a geographic move which immediately changes not only their location but also their lifestyle and breaking their relationship with the land and environment. At the moment many are entirely dependent on Chinese subsidies in order to survive. The next step for their 'resettlement' into towns is likely to be voluntary: As soon as the subsidies stop then they will have no choice but to move into towns in order to survive.

Meanwhile, Tibetans inside Tibet have no permission to go to India. There is a ban on passports. With a combined effect of these factors it becomes easier to understand why frustrations are being to surface in a much more dramatic and even 'violent' way. The pressure inside Tibet is increasing both directly through persecution and indirectly through ethnic tensions and economic failure. The 'new realities' is that 'peaceful protest' is no longer the mode of discontent, and perhaps a change is what is needed to recapture the attention of the international arena after the Olympic Flame has faded.